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Homicide-Appeal--Review of Evidence.-Where 
testified that blow she 
in evidence was for triers 
ment of conviction of uwcu~l"'L'fS 
sume that believed 
of oceurrenees on 
Criminal Law-Trial-Offer of Evidence-RenewaL-Where 
court evidence 
its admissibility, 
should rene\,- his 
definite decision is desired. 
or withholds decision as to 
to introduce such evidence 
court's attention to fact that 
[3] Homicide-Appeal-Harmless Error-Exclusion of Evidence.-
J;;xclusion of evidence in homicide case, offered in of 
theory of necessary self-defense, that about two years prior 
to homicide physician had found defendant in very run-down 
eondltion due to glandular disturbances which caused her to 
he emotionally unstable and that had reported such 
condition to defendant's husband, victim of homicide, was not 
prejudicial error where other as to defendant's 
physical condition over the years was in evidence. 
[4] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Where court in 
homicide case gave 20 general instructions on self-defense most 
of which impartially stated law on subject, and in addition two 
"prosecution-slanted' instructions, refusal to give two "de-
fense-slanted" instructions could not alone have so prejudiced 
defendant as to warrant reversal of judgment of conviction of 
manslaughter. 
!d.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-Where self-de-
fense was relied on by defendant in homicide case, and question 
whether she or her husband, the was aggressor was a 
issue in case, the giving of two instructions as to use of 
deadly weapon by defendant, stating the rule negatively and 
from viewpoint of prosecution, and failure to give the two re-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 251; Criminal Law, 
§ 269; [3] Homicide, § 266; [ 4-6] Homicide § 267; [7] Homicide, 
§ 207; [8] Criminal Law, § 734. 
G18 
error 
haYe favor of 
[6] !d.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.--Pailure to 
instruction m homicide case as to influence of antecedent 




of crime deceased had assaulted ULL~~"'uacu 
!d.-Instructions-Self-defense.-\Vherc defendant's uu," IJi)IHU 
court order from molest-
of crime came to house in Yiolation 
such and oYer defendant's that she did not 
want to see him, pounded door cmtrance, ran 
rooms in house and portion of 
instruction that right of self-defense does not exist as 
person in threat<ming or to threaten 
injury, is acting lawfully, was error. 
[8] Criminal I.aw-Instructions-Applicability to Evidence.-An 
instruction, though correct statement of abstract proposition 
of is improper when it finds no support in evidence, and 
is ground for reversal if it is calculated to mislead 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Charles \V. Fricke, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder ,Judgment of conviction of man-
slaughter, reversed. 
\V ard Sullivan, Dockweiler & Dockwei1er and Frederick 
C. Dockweiler for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Norman H. Sokolow, 
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney 
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan, Robert \Vheeler and J. 
Miller Leavy, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant, Patricia Gallagher Moore, ap-
peals from a judgment of conviction of manslaughter and 
from an order denying her motion for a new trial. (Defendant 
was charged by information with the crime of murder; the 
jury returned a verdict of manslaughter.) 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 39 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 125 
et seq. 
Oct. 1954] 
married and each 
JVJ:oore's 
Dr. Moore 
PEOPLE v. MooRE 
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Dr. Telford I. 
been previously 
Mrs. 
Antonia years of age; 
was 16 years of age. Dr. and Mrs. 
In after Dr. Moore's 
the moved to 
an office for the 
with the children, 
office Mrs. 
Moore ·worked in the under her maiden name, and in 
the for the In 1948, due to long hours 
of work and abusive treatment from her husband, Mrs. Moore 
had a nervous breakdown and was under the care of three 
vvho gaYe her "shock" treatments. Defendant 
eeaf':ed work at that time for three months but Dr. Moore 
brought home office books and records for her to keep at 
home. At about this Dr. Moore giving defendant 
large doses of sedatiYes and narcotics. At this time, the couple 
owned quite a large home whieh Mrs. Moore was endeavoring 
to keep up with spasmodic help. Defendant repeatedly 
requested permission to cease working in the doctor's office 
so that she might devote her entire time to caring for the 
home and the children. These requests were the subject of 
many heated and abnsiYe arguments and were refused until 
approximately the first of April, 1951. 
In October, 1949, another woman was hired to assist Mrs. 
Moore in the and in ,June, 1951, Mrs. Moore on the ad-
·l'ice of her physicians took a trip to Hawaii with two of the 
chihlren. She returned in July, 1951, having heard that her 
husbaud was associating with a Mrs. Betty Blanchard. On 
Angnst 27, 1951, defendant filed an action against Dr. Moore 
for separate maintenance. After a hearing, the court made 
its order directing Dr. Moore to leave the family home, to pro-
vide for the support of defendant and the child of the 
couple, and prohibiting Dr. Moore from molesting the de-
fendant. On December 7, 1951, at Dr. Moore's the 
couple entered into a reconciliation agreement and resumed 
marital relations. the agreement, defendant was given 
the home and its furnishings. Dr. Moore moved out of the 
home on ,January 14, 1952, and recorded a notice of rescission 
of tl1e reconciliation agreement. Defendant's attorney had 
many conferences with Dr. Moore in which he attempted. 
without success, to obtain funds for Mrs. Moore. Finally, 
not at home. She 
and one 
,Jnst aftrr Mrs. Moore had driven 
il1 an effort find Mr. Blanchard 
·who \Vas said not to be at After the eaHs had been 
the rang nnd defendant answered it. Patrieia 
·who was and who testified to the above also 
tPstified that >Yllen defendant answered the phone, she heard 
lwr say "I r1on 't want to see you," "That's we haYe 
" "Where are yon " and that defendant then re-
the receiver. Defendant then told Patricia that Dr. 
Moore ; she did want to see him ; that 
he was in and would arrive in about 15 minutes .. 
Patricia then told defendant that Dr. Moore had called while 
defendant not at lwme and asked if she could be out 
he said he had been served 
defendant wanted to "this 
OYer ann settled. Patricia tes;tified that she told him she knew 
Mrs. Moore did want to it settled because she eouldn 't 
the she Dr. 
and 
want to settle ; 
erm:.v and d~mented; 
told him that fat't 
his wife on a "starvation 





Mrs: Jones and 
that she would 
the whole 
room 
to leave and meet 
Dr. Moore 
could be settled ; 
him. 
afraid of Dr. Moore corniillg 
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at ; 
to meet them so that 
,_.,"",.,,.,., was to stay in 
her if she were 
U.C• • .:;u•U.Q,LLl> said 
she was} ''that might 
went downstairs and sent 
Defendant then 
1=r r.lr"'<r""' to the Blanchards to 
for her. 
After sending Patricia to care for Timmy, defendant went 
to her room and procured the gun which had been given her 
Police Officer Sawyer for her protection. As Patricia 
heard the goiilg there was a loud pound-
ing on the front door which stopped when opened 
it and said ''hello.'' After the front door closed, Patricia 
heard some running around for about five minutes; then 
something like ''thuds''; then a sound like someone falling 
to floor, and about a second later, about the time I 
heard Mrs. Moore scream, I heard a shot.'' 
Defendant that when she the door, she 
had the gnn in her hand which was hanging at her 
side ; that she opened the door her left hand. As she 
opened the door Dr. Moore rushed through the house, run-
ning from the hall into the pantry, through the dining room, 
back into the hall, pantry and again into the 
room where he hit with his :fists, knocking her to 
the floor so as to render her momentarily stunned and un-
conscious. The circumstantial evidence that a bullet 
from defendant's gun, from the direction wl1ere she said 
she was knocked hit the door from dining 
room into pantry and ricocheted Dr. Moore's body, 
passing through both of the aorta. testified 
that she tried to reach the to go to 
that she might lock in; that as she approached the 
stairway, she saw her husband toward her with his 
hands raised ; that she closed her eyes, squeezed the gun, dis-
It appears, and the evidence \Vas 
numerous persons that he was afraid that if he talked to her 
he would kill her; that when another doctor remonstrated 
\Vith him for defendant such doses of sodium 
that he didn't care if he did kill 
Other witnesses 
bruised 
and lacerated from blows her Dr. Moore. 
'l'here was evidence Dr. Moore had told defendant he 
would mutilate face ; that he would return and rake her 
bones out of the ashes; that '' '' would find her m 
the ; that he would rnn over her with car. 
in the house with de-
"'""""''"'" her from Dr. Moore and she testified that 
she saw him pick defendant up and throw her across the room 
into a chair. 1\ former , testified that 
he had her the gun when he on her person, evi-
dence of a administered the deceased and after 
she had told him that her had threatened to do 
away with her. 
Defendant contends evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict ; that the court erred in certain 
testimony; that the court erred in giving, and refusing to 
give, certain instructions. 
that at the time she shot her 
court evi-
a decision as to its admissi-
introduce the evidence should 
or call the court's attention to the fact that 
decision is desired.' v. 51 
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defendant's condition over the years was admitted 
in evidence and vvhile the of Dr. Billig would have 
been admissible under the rule of v. Smith, 151 Cal. 
619 P. , relied upon it does not appear 
that its exclusion could have her in any way. 
INSTRUCTIONS ALLEGEDLY ERRONEOUSLY GIVEN 
''The law does not or one who intends to 
commit an assault upon another to in advance his own 
defense a or a combat with a view 
thereby to create a situation wherein the infliction of the 
intended will appear to have been done in self-defense.'' 
''"Where a person seeks or induces a quarrel which leads 
to the in his own defense of using force against 
his adversary, the to stand his ground and thus defend 
himself is not immediately available to but, instead he 
first must decline to carry on the affray, must honestly en-
deavor to escape from it, and must fairly and clearly inform 
his adversary of his desire for peace and of his abandon-
ment of the contest. Only when he has done so will the law 
justify him in thereafter standing his ground and using force 
upon his antagonist.'' 
The above-quoted instructions were given at the request 
of the People. It is conceded that they are correct statements 
of abstract propositions of law, but it is argued that there 
was no evidence in the record that defendant sought or in-
duced a quarrel with deceased. It is argued that Dr. Moore 
had been restrained by court order from molesting defendant; 
that the house had been given to her; that Dr. Moore called 
defendant and told her, over her protests, that he was coming 
to see her; that he ran through the house and that he struck 
her causing her to fall to the floor before the shot was ftren. 
On the other hand, it is argued that defendant met him at 
the door with a gun. 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED AND ALLEGEDLY ERRONEOUSLY 
REFUSED 
(1) "If the jury believe from the evidence that Telford 
Moore attempted to and was about to commit an assault upon 
the defendant and that at the time he did so the defendant 
had a right to repel and resist the assault of Telford Moore 
and use all necessary force to repel the same." 
525 
unlawful 
with a violent 
on the person of another. 
''If you believe from the or if you entertain a 
reasonable doubt that decedent ·was the aggressor 
in the or that he assaulted the person the de:tencdant, 
then the defendant was entitled under the law to invoke the 
aid of self defense and iu so she had the to law-
resort such means and force as her may have ap-
peared necessary under all the circumstances a reasonable 
person to or resist the same. 
''If after a careful consideration of all the evidence, you 
should believe therefrom, or if you should entertain a reason-
able doubt therefrom, that the defendant herein was the 
victim of an assault at the hands of decedent or if you believe 
that the defendant at that time, as a reasonable person honestly 
and in good faith believed herself to be the victim of such an 
assault, although you might find that she was in fact mis-
taken, then you are instructed that she was entitled to act 
upon such appearances with safety and defend herself, al-
though it may afterwards have been shown that the appear-
ances were not justified by the facts.'' 
( 3) "If the jury believe from the evidence that Telford 
Moore was the first aggressor in the difficulty which resulted 
in what occurred, then the defendant was not obliged to fly 
or run, but had the right to stand her ground and repel any 
assault or threatened assault.'' 
The trial court gave three instructions on the right of 
self-defense which defendant concedes to be fair and impar-
tial statements of the law on that subject. [4] The failure 
to give the above three instructions is claimed to be prejjldicial 
error when coupled with the instructions given on the sub-
ject at the request of the prosecution. Those two instructions, 
it is claimed, state the position of the People and since they 
were given, in order to achieve impartiality, the two requested 
by defendant should have been given. The court gave, in all, 
20 general instructions on self-defense most of which impar-
tially state the law on the subject. In addition, the two 
"prosecution-slanted" instructions which have been hereto-
fore quoted were given. It would appear that the court's 
refusal to give the two "defense-slanted" instructions could 
not, alone, have so prejudiced defendant as to warrant a re-
versal of the judgment. 
versary.'' 
Under the 
defense is relied upon, 
was 
the defendant had 
'-''"~Luuo further trouble 
Dr. or Mrs. Moore was the 
issues, if not the 
the of 
of the 
difference between and 
law favorable to one or the 
every lawyer 
knows. to self-defense should not 
have been stated from the of the prose-
cution. There should be absolute as between the 




udiced the defendant's 






It is admitted that no instruc-
"You instruetefl that if you believe from the evidence 
528 
that 
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the defendant Patricia 
tm:·m.anon either from the deceased 
aeau'"" her life or person made 
she is justified in 
more harsher measures for her own pro-
tection in than would a person '.vho had not 
received such threats and if you should believe from the evi-
dence that the deceased did make threats the defendant 
and because thereof defendant had reasonable cause to fear 
than she would have had otherwise, you are 
to take such facts into consideration in determining whether 
defendant acted in a manner which a reasonable person would 
act in his or her own life or bodily safety.'' 
There was ample evidence in the record to justify giving 
the above instruction which was held a proper one in People 
v. Graham, 62 Cal.App 758, 765 [217 P. 823], and People v. 
Bradfield, 30 Cal.App. 721, 727 [159 P. 443]. A judgment 
of conviction of second degree murder was reversed in PeoplP 
v. Torres, 94 Cal.App.2d 146 [210 P.2d 324], because of the 
failure to the same instruction. It vvas said there, "It 
is conceded that no instruction was given with respect to the 
influence of antecedent threats on the right of self-defense. 
·where, as in this case, there is evidence tending to show the 
making of threats of death or great~odily harm by deceased 
against the defendant, which are re ~ed on as influencing or 
justifying defendant's act, instruc ion on the law of this 
subject is proper ( 41 C.J.S., Homicide, § 382, p. 185) and 
if not covered a correct instruction on the subject proposed 
by one of the parties should be given .... [T]he proposed 
instruction would not tell the jury that under the circum-
stances mentioned the defendant would be justified in com-
mitting an assault with a deadly weapon in self-defense, but 
only that the jury was 'to take such facts and circumstances 
into . . . consideration in determining whether the defendant 
acted in a manner in which a reasonable man would act in 
protecting his own life or bodily safety.' Moreover, the well 
known rule that each instruction need not contain a complete 
statement of the law but that it is sufficient that all instruc-
tions taken correctl.v do so, applies obviously also to 
instructions proposed by a party and refused. Many more 
instructions on self-defense were proposed and many were 
given. The jury were instructed in the language of section 
197, subdivision 3, Penal Code, that homicide is justifiable 
in self-defense 'when there is reasonable ground to apprehend 
Oct. 529 
she >nus the aggressor. 
self-defense in Yiew of the facts heretofore 
pointed out the of which of the two ·was the 
aggressor was of vital The 
should have been instrneted on influeuer of ante-
eedent threats so far as tJ1e conduct of defendant 
herself with t1Je weapon the in 
concerned. 
lNSTRUCTIOX Au~EGEDLY Ermo:~EOUSLY 
''The right of self-defense exists 
ful attack. The does not 
acting 
from molesting his 
the order and 
him. vVhen he 
he ran 
house and asf':anlted hiR 
the instruction invited the 
530 PEOPLE v. MooRE [43 C.2d 
door open for surmise and : that rffect was to 
implant on the the belief that the court 
that at the time of the was in law-
ful manner and that defendant's claim of self'"defense had no 
basis in fact. Defendant with to t11is in-
struction seems meritorious. 'l'lle counter ·with the 
statement that even if the deceased 1rere 
manner on the in the 
that the right of self-defense exists 
attack. It is true that the first sentence ho;n•yer, 
the second sentence and of the iustruetion deals 
with a person bodily injury who is 
and informs the jury that the of self-defense does not 
then exist. \V e find no in the reeord for the second 
part of the instruction. ']'he home to defendant who 
had told her husband l'lhe did not want to !'ICc him on that 
It is true that subsequently shr told lwr friends to leave be-
cause her husband might not if lw saw their ears in front 
of the house, but so far as the deceased knPw when he 
he was coming in violation not onl~· of hrr wishrR bnt of a 
eourt order prohibiting him from her. His <'onduct 
after entering the house could not be said to be indieatiye of a 
law-abiding nature. [8] An instrnetion which finds no 
support in the record. even thm1gh a eorred statement of an 
abstract proposition of law, is 1vhc>n it finds no sup-
port in the evidence, and it is grouml fo1· reYersal if it is cal-
culated to mislead the jur~· CaLTnr. . In People 
v. Silver, 16 Ca1.2c1 714. 723 [108 P.2d , we said: "Where 
errors in instructions occur, the al'ways arises as to 
whether or not they are prejudicial. H0re it may be said that 
where the proof of a defendant's guilt is c1ear, and no exten-
uating circumstances appeae, snrh Prrors may not be preju-
dicial. But where a case, sneh as the one at bar, is what may 
b0 tPrnwr1 a 'do;;;e' ease, and \Yherr thr e-rroneous instruction,; 
eoneern matters vital to the dcfem:c of the defendant, and may 
have resulted in a miscarriage of jm:tiee, we are of the opinion 
that sueh errors must he regarded as prejudicial and should 
result in a new trial for the defendant." (People v. Hamil-
ton, 33 Cal.2d 45 [198 P.2d 873] ; Peoz?le v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 
880 [156 P.2d 7]; People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2c1. 401 
[164 P.2d 753] .) 
In summary, we finrl that t~Yo instructions on self-defense 
were given from the viewpoint of the proseeution and, ·while 
numerous instructions on that subjeet were given, no one of 
PEOPLE v. lYIOORE 
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to have been 
or from that of vie·w. 
flucnce of antecedent tln·eats \Yas 
stated favorably to the 
An instruction on the in-
ed the defendant 
and refused the trial court. Snell an instruction found 
in the record. 1\n instruction which told the 
of self-defem;e did not exist as against a 
to threaten injury, 
in the evidence. 
that 1vhere the evidenee on the i;.;sue 
or of the was the aggressor is as balanced 
as it is in this case and where there was euor in the giving and 
of instructions on the vital matter of self-defense on 
of the defendant that may have resulted in a mis-
of it must be coneltu1cd that the error· was 
and slwuld result in a reversal of the judgment 
awl the order clefenda11t a new trial. (People v. Hil-
ver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723 [108 P.2d 4]; People Y. Harnrilton, 38 
Cal.2d 45 [198 P.2d ; People v. lV eathe1·[ord, 27 Cal.2d 
401 [164 P.2d 758] .) 
F'or the foregoing reasons, the jndgment and the order de-
nying defendant's motion for a mw trial are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spenee, J., eoneurred. 
SCHAUEH, ,J.-I dissent. In my opinion, examination of 
the entire reeord in this ease impels the conclusion that no 
error of any substance appears, that the evidence strongly 
supports the verdict, and that no misearriage of justice has 
ocenrred. 
Much of the lengthy reporter's transcript is devoted to a 
picture of the domestic relations of defendant and Dr. JYioore 
to the killing of Dr. Moore on May 6, 1952. The dis-
eord between them increased after defendant returned from 
Hawaii in Jnly, 1951, instituted her separate maintenance 
aetion against Dr. Moore, and hired detectives to follow Dr. 
JYioore and to obtain recorded evidenee against him. It ap-
pears unnecessary to recount details of the various verbal 
and physical altereations between defendant and Dr. JYioore 
which appear in the record and a number of which are re-
fen·ed to in the majority opinion. 
It may be mentioned that the majority opinion states, 
"A former police officer, Sawyer, testified that he had given 
her the gun [which defendant thereafter used to shoot Dr. 
JYioore] when he saw, on her person, evidence of a beating 
tends 
As 
Defendant then the gun, went down-
with . Moore's knock with it in 
her hand. 
After she had shot Dr. Moore defendant went to the tele-
or an ambulance, or call 
but telephoned her friends 
and Mrs. Blanchard. 
this is Pat. I have just done 
''You have done what, Pat?'' ; she 
''I have shot Telford.'' Defendant in her con-
versation with Mrs. Blanchard called the latter a "lowdown 
bitch'' and told her to send all defendant's friends back to 
house. 
defendant stated and testified that she recalled 
one it was proved by physical 
evidence that two shots had been fired; that the lethal bullet 
was fired from the dining room toward the swinging door be-
had his 
into the entrance hal1, fired the 
was still upright in the entrance 
wall above him. 
The jury were warranted in 
appeal we are bound to the 
mine-that on the 
herself to meet Dr. Moore while she was in a 
his asserted affair with Mrs. Blanchard and 
to force Dr. Moore to go to the Blanchards 
that if at any time before Dr. Moore 
533 
a '' shmvdown ''; 
defendant was 
in fear, she could the to the called 
the police, or recalled the 
Blancllards, but that she these choices; that if the 
doctor struck defendant before he was shot, he did so to pro-
tect himself and in an to disarm defendant; that the 
armed defendant did not act in necessary self-defense when 
she killed the unarmed Dr. lYioore. 
Contrary to defendant's pv'''"'"u, 
evidence which the 
cededly correct statements of 
opinion at page 524. From the 
ferred that Dr. 
be in-
the original 
aggressor in the mn~ .. ADNA,rl a that 
Dr. Moore should confront 
serted paramour, which she 
unwilling to do. After 
Moore, refusjng the aid of her 
husband of his as-
have realized he would be 
her lack of fear of Dr. 
and clearing 
534 PEOPLE v. MooRE [43 0.2d 
her house of potential witnesses, she armed herself with a 
gun and displayed it when she the door to Dr. Moore. 
There is overwhelming evidence of it from defendant 
herself and from made by her) that in previous 
quarrels with the doctor, defendant had not merely persisted 
in provocative abuse but had the use of physical 
violence and had made no effort to terminate 1 he altercations. 
The jury were justified in that in this as in 
altercations Mrs. Moore's conduct was to provoke 
rather than to avoid an 
As appears from the majority defendant vV'Cllf-'>O.Jl.UO 
of the refusal of instructions quoted at 
pages 524, 525 of that opinion, ·which are phrased in terms of 
the law applicable ''If the jury believe from the evidence 
that Telford Moore attempted to and was about to commit 
an assault upon defendant'' and ''If the jury believe from 
the evidence that Telford Moore was the first aggressor." 
Instructions which the trial court gave on the subject of self-
defense1 adequately and fairly cover the law on the subject 
and are properly phrased to apply to whomever the jury 
considered the instigator of the affray. 
Defendant asserts that the giving of the instructions quoted 
at pages 525, 526 of the majority opinion unduly emphasized 
the prosecution point of view, and the majority, without suffi-
1 The trial court gave the following mstructions: 
"It is lawful for a person who is being assaulted, and who has 
reasonable ground for believing that bodily injury is about to be inflicted 
upon him, to stand his ground and defend himself from such attack, and 
in doing so he may nse all force and means which he believes to be 
reasonably necessary and whieh would appear to a reasonable person, 
in the same or similar cir0umstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury 
which appears to be imminent.'' 
''A person who has been attaeke(l and who is exeTcising his right of 
lawful self-defense is not required to retTeat, and he not only may stand 
his ground and defend himself against the attack but may also pmsue 
his assailant until he has secured himself from danger if that course 
n,ppears to him, and would appear to a reasonable person in the same 
situation, to he reasonably and apparently necessary; and this is his right 
even though he might more easily llaYe gained safety by withdrawing 
from the scene.'' 
''A person who withont fault on his part is to a sudden 
felonious attack need not retreat. In the exercise his right of self-
defense he may stand his ground and defend himself the use of 
all force and means apparently necessary and which appear to be 
neeessary to a reasonable person in the same situation and with the same 
knowledge; and he mny pmwe his nssailant until he has secured himself 
from danger if that course likewise appears reasonably necessary. This 
law applies even though the assailed person might more easily have 
gained safety hy flight or hy withdrawmg from the scene." 
PEOPLE v. MooRE 
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this argument. Defendant relies upon 
v. Eslraclct (1923), 60 Cal.App. 447, 483 [213 P. 67], 
v. Hatchett (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 158-159 
[146 P.2d , which emphasize that instructions should be 
not correct but also impartial in their point of view. 
rrhat of course, is true and should be strictly adhered 
to trial courts. In the Estrada case, however, the appellate 
court concluded that the prosecution evidence showed that 
acted only in and in the Hatchett case 
ihere vms evidence strongly tending to show that defendant 
acted in self-defense and the charge to the jury not only 
uu'"·"'''"" the prosecution's point of view in the instruction 
self-defense but also contained various errors which, 
the court concluded, in combination required re-
versal. In the present case the charge as a whole is not ''prose-
cution slanted" and there is evidence which strongly tends 
to show that the killing terminated the last of a long series 
of altercations which were instigated at least as much by 
defendant as by the husband she killed. 
The majority opinion accepts defendant's argument that 
the failure to give the requested instruction quoted at pages 
527, 528 of that opinion substantially prejudices defendant. 
The instruction, omitting the matter italicized and enclosed in 
brackets, was as follows: "[I]f you believe from the evidence 
that prior to the 6th day of May 1952, the defendant Patricia 
G. Moore had received information, either from the deceased 
or other persons, of threats against her life or person made 
the deceased Telford I. Moore [and believed such threats 
or waH thm·eby made more apprehensive of harm] she is jus-
tified in acting more quickly and taking harsher measures 
for her own protection in event of assault, than would a person 
who had not received such threats and if you should believe 
from the evidence that the deceased did make threats against 
the defendant and because thereof defendant had reasonable 
cause to [and did] fear greater peril than she would have 
had otherwise, you are to take such facts into consideration 
in determining whether defendant acted in a manner which 
a reasonable person would act in protecting his or her own 
life or bodily safety.'' 
Obviously the instruction as requested, lacking the qualify-
ing element that the threats, if made and communicated to 
defendant, were believed by her or at least made her more 
apprehensive of peril, is not a complete and accurate state-
ment of law. (People v. Gonzales (1887), 71 Cal. 569, 576 
one 
contain the element 
omitted from the 
instructions 
belief or increased apprehension) 
instruction and do not specifically 
lU<Lhlug of threats or translate those 
into a formula instruction applicable only on a 
resolution of the evidence favorable to the defendant. Such 
as are as follows : 
"The la>v of self-defense is founded on the principle of 
either actual or and in order to justify 
of human life on this ground the slayer, as a reason-
person, rmcst have reason to believe and rnttst believe 
there is a great bodily harm; and 
the circumstances must be such that an ordinarily 
reasonable person, if stwh person were in those oircurnstances 
and 'if such person knew and saw what Sitch person in real 
or knows and sees, would believe that it 
was necessary for such person to use, in one's defense and 
to avoid great to one's such force or means 
as cause the death of the " (Italics added.) 
'' Y ott w'ill note that actual danger is not necessary to 
If one is confronted by the appearance 
which arouses in his as a reasonable person 
an honest conviction and fear that he is about to suffer death 
reasonable man in a like 
would be jttsti-
and if the person so 
such appearances and 
his right of self-
the same whether such danger is real or merely 
Even if in the light of after-acquired information 
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), 94 
held that under the 
instruction as to the vv''"·"v"'"' 
for reversal. But in that 
not appear to have 
last hereinabove 
act upon known facts as well as 
circumstances to the 
instruction as to the to act in self-defense appears to 
have been related to "the bnrnediate circumstances surround-
the encounter" and the court in its ruling stated that 
''as there could be no that . . . the 
'immediate circumstances' would not divert their [the jury's] 
attention from the the giving of the 
instruction them to consider the previous threats was 
made more '' in the Torres case 
it does not appear that the court's attention was directed to 
or that it considered any failure of the requested instruction 
to that the defendant actually believe or be made 
more apprehensive by the communicated threat. It is also 
noted that the instruction approved in the Torres case is 
taken from one which had been in People v. Grriharn 
, 62 Oal.App. 758, 765 [217 P. 823]. In the Graham 
case, the instruction was not held to be a necessary 
or even proper one to be given; it was merely held in affirming 
the judgment of conviction that "The instructions . , . given 
sufficiently covered the " 
While the trial court in the case could well have 
modified the proposed instruction to include the elements 
of bona fide belief in the threats or some measure of appre-
hension added thereby, in my opinion it cannot properly be 
held that the court erred in such instruction in 
the form To have it as would 
}Jave created a conflict between it and the instruction which 
''The law of self-defense is founded on the 
either actual or and in order 
of human life on this ground the 
as a reasonable person, must have reason to believe and rnust 
believe that there is a of receiving bodily harm.'' 
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In any event it appears that the entire 
on the of self~defense was fair and 
stance and the refusal of this 








that if Dr. Moore assaulted defendant, 
he did so in a vain to disarm her and saYe his own 
life; that defendant initiated a show of violence by displaying 
the gun; that she created a situation in which Dr. Moore. 
rather than have the of acting 
in self~defense. 
Defendant refers to her testimony that Dr. Moore ran 
through the swore at her, and struck her, asserts that 
he was acting in violation of the order by ·which he was 
enjoined from her, and says, "Where, we ask, is 
this evidence of an inference that he was acting 
lawfully." defendant's of the events 
immediately the does not indicate that Dr. 
Moore was as previously pointed 
out, other evidence from which the jury could, and under 
established law we should presume did, infer that she de-
liberately incited the affray and did not thereafter put herself 
in a position where she was jnstified in using deadly force, 
anrl that Dr. Moore struck defendant in an effort to disarm 
her. On such entirely tenable view of the evidence the last 
quoted instruction is not an erroneous statement of law. 
Defendant complains of the playing before the jury of 
tapE' recordings of conversations between the defendant and 
dt>ct>ased. \Vhen she first raised this point on appeal she 
asserted that the were in inaudible and un-
intelligible. She relied upon v. Stephens (1953), 117 
Cal.App.2d 660 P.2d , where it was held that 
"to be admissible in t>vidence, the conversations aR recorded, 
should be audible and And if not, the witness 
who had the conversations should be called to testify." In 
539 
what can be heard 
at that time~" and she testified that it was. 
Defendant's that the were 
was advanced for the first time after she had taken her appeaL 
The original of the as 
in the courtroom is with asterisks; ac-
cording to a filed affidavit of the court reporter, 
the asterisks were used to indicate both omissions of words 
which he could not transcribe and to pauses; the 
reporter further avers that when he listens to a recording 
without occasion to report it he can grasp its meaning with-
out ascertaining each but that in to a record-
ing as a reporter and attempting to coordinate his hearing, 
understanding, and reporting, his task is more complex and 
his understanding is below the standard of court reporting. 
After the defendant advanced the contention on appeal 
that the recordings should not have been played before the 
jury because they were unintelligible, the People presented 
to the trial court a more complete transcript of the record-
ings which had been prepared after the reporter had heard 
and reported a replaying of the recordings ; the prosecuting 
attorney offered defendant's counsel an opportunity to listen 
to the recordings again and compare them with the proffered 
transeript; defendant's counsel declined to do so; and the 
trial court on the People's motion ordered that the more 
complete transcript be substituted for the transcript of the 
courtroom notes. 
The People then obtained an order of the District Court 
of AppeaF for augmentation of the record supplemental 
reporter's and clerk's transcripts of the last mentioned trial 
c~ourt proceedings. Thereafter defendant moved the District 
Court of Appeal to strike the supplemental transcripts from 
ihe record, and this motion is now before us. 
It does not appear that the playing of the recordings (which, 
it will be remembered, were caused to be made by defendant) 
• At the time of the motion the cause was pending before the District 
Court of Appeal. It has since been transferred to this court. 
Ill 
could aff:ect the 
-whether the some nine months 
For the reasons above stated the motion to strike the 
transcripts should be denied; the judgment 
and order appealed from should be affirmed. 
concurred. 
was denied November 
were of 
